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THE PETROLEUM EXCLUSION-STRONGER




IL and natural gas are exempt from the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA or Superfund), as amended.1 Because of our society's
widespread use of oil and natural gas, this so-called "petroleum exclusion"
affects not only the oil and gas industry, but also a broad cross-section of our
economy. 2 The Environmenial Protection Agency (EPA) has observed that
the petroleum exemption from the Superfund program is a major restriction
on the agency's authority at toxic waste sites.3
Tliroughout the last decade, EPA's national office has stated repeatedly
that the petroleum exclusion exists in the law and must be given effect.4
Similarly, virtually every court that has considered the exclusion has con-
strued it broadly, often at EPA's own urging.5 Yet, while some of EPA's
regional offices have applied the petroleum exclusion as written, other re-
gional offices have either ignored the exclusion or advanced a variety of ar-
guments to justify denying its benefits. One such argument is that even
where the exclusion concededly applies, the government can still impose
CERCLA-like strict, joint and several liability under other state and federal
* A.B. Economics, Dartmouth College; J.D., Cornell Law School. Founder and princi-
pal litigator of Bailer Hammett, P.C., specializing in litigation, settlements, and counseling
under the major environmental statutes, particularly the Compenhensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act. The author also has extensive experience in risk
assessment and public health issues.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)). CERCLA generally imposes strict, joint and several liability for the costs of respond-
ing to actual or potential releases of "hazardous substances" from a qualifying site upon past
and present owners and operators of the site, upon persons who arranged for disposal of haz-
ardous substances at the site, and upon persons who transported hazardous substances to the
site. Id. §§ 9601(a)(14), 9604(a)(i), 9607.
2. The federal government itself has not been reluctant to invoke the petroleum exclu-
sion. See State of New York v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 374, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
3. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 2, Wilshire
Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5708).
The brief stated that "[t]he statutory petroleum exclusion is one of the most significant restric-
tions on the response authority provided under the Superfund program for the cleanup of toxic
waste sites." Id.
4. See infra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
laws,6 including section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA).7
On July 31, 1989, EPA's General Counsel addressed this problem by issu-
ing a comprehensive internal guidance document on the scope of the petro-
leum exclusion. 8 The General Counsel determined that the petroleum
exclusion applies to all commercial forms of petroleum, including those that
typically contain hazardous constituents, so long as the petroleum has not
been adulterated or contaminated during use by extraneous hazardous
substances. 9
The General Counsel's interpretation received its first test in the courts in
Wilshire Westwood Associates, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp.'0 The Wilshire
Westwood case involved the question of whether the petroleum exclusion ap-
plies to leaded gasoline. Upon learning of the General Counsel's interpreta-
tion, the district court reconsidered and reversed an earlier ruling that the
petroleum exclusion does not apply to leaded gasoline because it contains
lead, which is a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA in other contexts.'I
When Wilshire Westwood reached the Ninth Circuit, it became the first
case in which litigants fully briefed and argued the merits of the petroleum
exclusion to a federal court of appeals. Recognizing the case's potentially
significant precedential effect, EPA filed a brief as amicus curiae in support
of the defendants. EPA argued that the statutory language, legislative his-
tory, agency interpretations, and policy considerations underlying the petro-
leum exclusion all required affirmance of the district court's decision.12 As a
result, many interested parties, including EPA itself, hoped that the Ninth
Circuit would issue a definitive interpretation of the scope of the petroleum
exclusion that would have broad application elsewhere. While the Ninth
Circuit ultimately found that the petroleum exclusion applied to leaded gas-
oline,' 3 it stopped short of issuing the definitive interpretation that many of
those interested had expected. For other parties relying on the exclusion in
other contexts, however, the court's opinion does, in fact, provide some valu-
able guidance.
6. Letter from F. Michael Thomas, Senior Assistant Regional Counsel, EPA Region I,
to James Bailer (May 16, 1987) (discussing Petroleum Group's proposal regarding ranking of
potentially responsible parties at the Cannons Engineering Superfund sites).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2826 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6987 (1988).
8. Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel, to J. Winston Porter,
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Scope of the CERCLA
Petroleum Exclusion Under Sections 101(14) and 104(a)(2) (July 31, 1987) [hereinafter Gen-
eral Counsel's Memorandum] reprinted in 14 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. (Computer L. Rep.)
842 (1987).
9. Id at 844-47.
10. 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2146, 2146-47 (C.D. Cal. 1987), rev'gon reconsideration, 27
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1800 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
11. 27 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) at 2146-47.
12. See supra note 3.
13. 881 F.2d at 804-05.
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE PETROLEUM EXCLUSION BEFORE
WILSHIRE WESTWOOD
A. Legislative History
Since 1980, Congress has considered regulating releases of petroleum into
the environment in several different contexts. On each occasion, Congress
has expressly declined to subject responsible parties to CERCLA-like strict,
joint and several liability. Congress has adopted some alternatives, and con-
gressional leaders' explanations for these alternatives are difficult to recon-
cile with the notion that Congress believed CERCLA-like liability for
releases of petroleum could already be imposed under section 7003 of
RCRA.
When Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, it made the term "hazardous
substance" the operative term for the purposes of the response and liability
provisions of the Act. 14 In section 101(14),15 Congress defined the term
"hazardous substance" as one specifically listed or designated as hazardous
under any of several other environmental statutes identified in subsections
(A) through (F) of that section. 16 Because Congress did not specifically list
or designate crude oil, most refined petroleum products, and natural gas, as
hazardous under the named statutes, it need not have gone further to exempt
oil and natural gas from CERCLA. Nonetheless, to emphasize its intent to
exclude oil and natural gas from CERCLA, Congress concluded section
101(14) with a proviso that petroleum (including crude oil and any fraction
of crude oil) not otherwise specifically listed or designated as hazardous was
not a hazardous substance. In addition, the term "hazardous substance" did
not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or synthetic
gas usable for fuel.17
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603, 9604(a)(1), 9607.
15. Id. § 9601(14).
16. "Hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to sec-
tion 31 l(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (B) any element,
compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 102 of
this Act, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not includ-
ing any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has
been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section
307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (E) any hazardous air pollu-
tant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administra-
tor has taken action pursuant to section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not
include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
Id.
17. Id. Under § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1), response actions could also be trig-
gered by releases or substantial threats of releases of any "pollutant or contaminant which may
present an imminent or substantial danger to the public health or welfare.. . ." In § 101(33),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(33), Congress also excluded petroleum from the definition of "pollutant or
contaminant," using virtually the same language as it had used in § 101(14).
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Congress did not define the terms "petroleum," "fraction," or "natural
gas" in CERCLA, nor did the legislative history go into much detail. In
fact, the Wilshire Westwood court noted that the legislative history was not
helpful in determining the scope of the petroleum exclusion.' 8 Still, much
can be learned from what Congress has done or failed to do about petroleum
during the last decade, and the debates surrounding the enactment of CER-
CLA in 1980 are an essential starting point.
CERCLA was the product of a last-minute congressional compromise
among three competing bills.' 9 On the House side, H.R. 7020, the Hazard-
ous Waste Containment Act, focused on remedying pollution from chemical
dumps on land and did not cover spills of petroleum. Petroleum spills were
the subject of a separate, companion bill, H.R. 85, the Oil Pollution and
Compensation Act. The leading bill in the Senate was S. 1480, the Environ-
mental Emergency Response Act, which provided for "an ambit of liability
significantly larger than that under H.R. 7020." This bill, however, did not
cover petroleum.20 The House of Representatives sent H.R. 7020 and H.R.
85 to the Senate but the latter bill died.2' Thus, both the House and Senate
bills remaining under consideration excluded petroleum, as did the legisla-
tion Congress ultimately passed.22
In the debates on the compromise bill, several members of Congress ex-
pressed concern about the lack of authority under the bill to respond to re-
leases of petroleum. Typical of these responses were the comments of
Representative Mikulski of Maryland. Representative Mikulski was pre-
pared to accept Senate assurances of future consideration of an oilspill pro-
posal in order to secure swift passage of legislation dealing with abandoned
18. Wilshire Westwood, 881 F.2d at 805. The court stated that "ft]here is virtually no
legislative history contemporaneous with the enactment of CERCLA directly relevant to the
scope of the petroleum exclusion." Id.
19. Id. at 805-06; Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902-05 (D.N.H. 1985). For
an extensive history of the 1980 debates on CERCLA, see Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
20. Grad, supra note 19, at 7, 22. The Senate Report accompanying S. 1480, S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 30-31 (1980) explained only that:
[P]etroleum, including crude oil and including fractions of crude oil which are
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as hazardous substances under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of the definition, is excluded from the definition
of hazardous substance. The reported bill does not cover spills or other releases
strictly of oil. It is also important to note that natural gas, liquified natural gas
(LNG), and high BTU synthetic gas of pipeline quality (or mixtures of natural
gas and such synthetic gas) are not considered hazardous substances within the
purposes of S. 1480.
21. Grad, supra note 19, at 4.
22. The final compromise bill was called H.R. 7020 because the Superfund legislation was
a revenue measure that had to originate in the House. Id. at 29. In fact, however, the bill
consisted of the enacting clause of H.R. 7020 and the substance of S. 1480, as amended by the
Senate. The House considered and adopted the bill under a suspension of the rules, which in
this case meant that it had no opportunity to offer amendments. Id. at 29-30. "Faced with a




In 1984, in the course of amending and reauthorizing RCRA, Congress
had another opportunity to consider legislation to address releases of petro-
leum.24 Again, Congress declined to subject persons responsible for releases
of petroleum to CERCLA-like liability. Instead, it opted for more limited
remedies tailored to the specific problems before it.25
One of Congress's main concerns in 1984 was leakage from underground
storage tanks, particularly those containing petroleum, which Congress con-
sidered a major source of groundwater pollution.26 Because of the petro-
leum exclusion, however, Congress believed that under the Superfund
authority, the federal government could neither respond to nor cleanup a
petroleum products spill.27 Congress responded not by eliminating or weak-
ening the petroleum exclusion, but by enacting a new management program
for underground storage tanks under subtitle I of RCRA.28
Similarly, Congress's treatment of used oil in the 1984 amendments to
RCRA reflected its reluctance to impose CERCLA-like liability on persons
responsible for releases of petroleum. In 1984 an EPA report had noted that
used automotive and industrial oils typically contain heavy metals and nu-
23. Typical of these responses are the comments of Representive Mikulski of Maryland:
The Senate bill is substantially similar to the House measure, with the exception
that there is no oil title.
I realize that it is disappointing to see no oil-related provision in the bill, but
we must also realize that this is our only chance to get hazardous waste dump
site cleanup legislation enacted. I would note that we have had assurances from
Members of the Senate that an oilspill proposal would be considered a very high
legislative priority in the 97th Congress.
Moreover, there is already a mechanism in place that is designed to deal with
spills in navigable waterways. There is not, however, any provision currently in
our law that addresses the potentially ruinous situation of abandoned toxic
waste dump sites.
I, therefore, believe that it is very imperative that we pass the Senate bill as a
very important beginning in our attempt to defuse the ticking environmental
time bomb of abandoned toxic waste sites.
'126 CONG. REc. 31,976 (1980); see also 126 CONG. REc. 31,964, 31,968 (1980) (statement of
Rep. Florio); id. at 31,969 (statement of Rep. Broyhill); id. at 31,970 (statement of Rep.
Breaux); id. at 31,971-72 (statement of Rep. Biaggi); id. at 31,975 (statement of Rep. Snyder).
24. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L. No. 98-616,
§§ 101-704, 98 Stat. 3221, 3224-93 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991
(1988)) (amending the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
§§ 1001-8007, 90 Stat. 2795, 2795-841 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1988)) (amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 89-
272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965))).
25. See supra notes 28-34.
26. See 130 CONG. REc. § 2028 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
27. Senator Durenberger stated that "the Federal Government cannot under Superfund
authority respond or clean up a spill if it involves petroleum products." 130 CONG. REc.
§ 2028, 2080 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Durenberger), quoted in Wilshire
Westwood, 881 F.2d at 807; see also 130 CONG. REc. 20,826-30 (1984) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger) (discussing proposed amendment to protect groundwater sources from leaking
underground storage tanks); Id. at HI 1,141-42 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Florio) (requesting unanimous consent to consider an amendment to RCRA); id. at HI 1,1143
(statement of Rep. Eckhart supporting Rep. Florio's amendment); id. at Hi 1,144 (statement of
Rep. Ritter) (supporting Rep. Florio's amendment).
28. Section 601(a) of HSWA added Subtitle I to RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i.
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merous other toxic constituents. 29 Concerned by this report, Congress in
1984 gave EPA one year (until November 6, 1985) to propose whether to list
or identify used automobile and truck crankcase oil as hazardous wastes
under RCRA, and two years (until November 8, 1986) to make a final deter-
mination whether to list or identify used automobile and truck crankcase oil
and other used oils as hazardous wastes.30 As EPA promptly recognized,
the effect of listing used oils as hazardous wastes under RCRA would be to
subject used oils to CERCLA liability for the first time.31 Thus, once again,
instead of merely eliminating the petroleum exclusion or limiting its scope,
Congress chose a cautious, narrowly-focused alternative to avoid imposing
CERCLA-like liability unless absolutely necessary.
The special treatment of petroleum under the 1984 amendments to RCRA
is even more significant when seen in the light of Congress's simultaneous
revision of section 7003(a) of RCRA.32 By this revision, Congress clarified
that the government had authority under that provision to impose CER-
CLA-like liability upon non-negligent off-site generators of hazardous
wastes. 33 Had Congress believed that section 7003, from its inception, retro-
actively imposed strict, joint and several liability on persons responsible for
releases of petroleum, then Congress would have had no need to enact a
comprehensive new management program in 1984 for underground storage
tanks containing petroleum. Moreover, several key members of Congress
would not have sought to justify that program as being necessary to fill a gap
created by the petroleum exclusion.34 Likewise, Congress would not have
needed to require EPA to go to great lengths to determine whether listing
used oils as hazardous wastes under RCRA was necessary as a first step
toward imposing strict, joint and several liability under CERCLA.
Two years later, in the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
29. EPA, Listing of Waste Oil as Hazardous Waste 43-70 (Jan. 1981) (cited in 17 Chem.
Waste Litig. Rep. 3 (Computer L. Rep.) (1988)).
30. A new § 3014(b) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6935(b), which was added by § 242 of
HSWA, contained these requirements and deadlines.
31. In response to § 3014(b), EPA solicited public comments on listing used oil as a haz-
ardous waste and stated, "used oil will become a hazardous substance under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) as a result of
today's [proposed] listing . . . " 50 Fed. Reg. 49,258, 49,258 (proposed Nov. 29, 1985).
32. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5690; see also United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing congressional intent
for retroactive application of CERCLA), cert denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
33. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1984).
34. In the debates on the new Subtitle I of RCRA, Senator Durenberger noted:
[Tjank storage of one of the most common groundwater contaminants--gaso-
line-is unregulated because it is not waste product (and thus not under the
authority of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act), and spills of the fuel
cannot be cleaned up under the Superfund law because it is a petroleum
product.
130 CONG. REC. 3834 (1984) (emphasis added). Senator Durenberger apparently did not un-
derstand that releases of petroleum from underground storage tanks could be remedied by
§ 7003 of RCRA, and no other member of Congress suggested otherwise.
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of 1986 (SARA),35 Congress forcefully underscored its strong support for
the petroleum exclusion by re-enacting the exclusion without change. To
understand the full import of this action, it is useful to consider the evolution
of Congress's thinking about the problem of leaks from underground storage
tanks.
By 1986, Congress had concluded that a new management program under
subtitle I of RCRA could not adequately address the problem of leaks of
petroleum from underground storage tanks. 36 Nevertheless, Congress still
believed that the petroleum exclusion denied the government authority to
address such leaks.37 As in 1984, Congress responded by dealing directly
with the problem before it, while leaving the petroleum exclusion intact.
In the floor debates leading to the enactment of SARA, Senator Simpson38
advised his colleagues that the bill would not reduce the reach of the petro-
leum exclusion,39 which applied to a wide variety of petroleum-related prod-
ucts.40 In the House, Representative Hall similarly explained the bill. 41
With this knowledge, both houses of Congress reaffirmed the exclusion as it
had previously been in effect. To address the problem of leaks from under-
ground storage tanks, Congress added a new response program to subtitle I
of RCRA, supported by a $500 million Underground Storage Trust Fund.42
B. Court Decisions
Before the Ninth Circuit decided Wilshire Westwood, the petroleum exclu-
sion had been the subject of district court decisions in a variety of factual
settings.43 While none of these district courts had the benefit of a full record
and the extensive briefing that the parties submitted to the Ninth Circuit in
Wilshire Westwood, virtually all reached the same conclusion as the Wilshire
Westwood court: Congress intended the courts to apply the broad statutory
language of the petroleum exclusion as written.
For example, in Eagle-Picher Industries v. United States EPA " the court
accepted -EPA's argument that if Congress had wanted to carve out a
"broad" and "general" exception from CERCLA for mining wastes and fly
35. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675(1988)).
36. 132 CONG. REC. 9599 (1986) (statement of Rep. Roe); id. at H9572 (statement of Rep.
Strangeland); id. at 9625 (statement of Rep. Ekhart).
37. Id.
38. Senator Simpson was ranking member of the committee that prepared the Senate bill.
Grad, supra note 19, at 7-8.
39. 132 CONG. REc. S14,932 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson). Senator
Simpson stated that the bill would "not diminish the scope of the present petroleum exclu-
sion." Id.
40. Id. Senator Simpson explained that the exclusion applied to "all types of petroleum,
including crude oil, crude oil tank bottoms, refined fractions of crude oil, and tank bottoms of
such which are not specifically listed or designated as such under the other subparagraphs of
that provision [section 101(14)]." Id.
41. Id. at H9605 (statement of Rep. Hall).
42. Section 205 of SARA added the new subsection 9003(h), 42 U.S.C. § 699lb(h), to
Subsection I of RCRA.
43. See infra notes 44-57.
44. 759 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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ash, it could have done so explicitly, as it had for petroleum. 45 Similarly, in
United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp.4 6 the court found that if Congress had
wanted to exclude asbestos wastes completely from CERCLA, then Con-
gress would have incorporated the exclusion into the petroleum and natural
gas exclusion.47
In The Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc.48 the court applied the petro-
leum exclusion to "waste cutting oil" used in the manufacture of gears.49
The Marmon Group court held that cutting oil fell within the petroleum
exclusion and thus was excluded specifically from CERCLA section
9601(4)'s definition of the term hazardous substance.50 In City of Philadel-
phia v. Stephan Chemical Co.,51 the court broadly applied the exclusion to
"petroleum products," and in United States v. Alexander5 2 the court dis-
missed a third-party action and denied various discovery requests against a
defendant whose contribution to a Superfund site consisted solely of crude
oil-tank bottoms.
In United States v. Wade 5 3 the court observed that it would be inconsis-
tent to define hazardous substance in such a way as to exclude fuel oil and
then treat fuel oil as hazardous because it contained hazardous constituents.
In New York v. United States54 the Justice Department argued on behalf of
the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force that jet fuel was exempt from
CERCLA even though it contained small amounts of CERCLA hazardous
substances such as benzene, toluene, and xylene. The court found the argu-
ment appealing, but did not reach the issue.55 Similarly, in the more recent
decision of City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.56 the court, relying
upon the EPA General Counsel's Memorandum of July 31, 1987, accepted
as true for the purpose of a motion for summary judgment that oil, grease,
phenol, and benzene produced from the distillation of petroleum fall entirely
within the petroleum exclusion.57
45. Id. at 927, 932; see also United States v. Union Gas Co., 586 F. Supp. 1522, 1524(E.D. Pa. 1984) (if Congress had intended subsection C of § 101(14) to exclude mining waste
and fly from CERCLA, "it would have placed the subsection (C) limitation in the separate
sentence concerning the general exclusion for petroleum and gas").
46. 584 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Ariz. 1984).
47. Id. at 1147.
48. No. 85-C-7838 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1986).
49. Id., slip op. at 2.
50. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on other grounds, but noted and let stand
the portion of the district court's opinion dismissing the CERCLA count on the basis of the
petroleum exclusion. The Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 822 F.2d 31, 33 (7th Cir.
1987).
51. No. 81-0851, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1982) (unpublished).
52. C.A. No. G-86-267 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 1987) (unpublished).
53. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,440-41 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 1984).
54. 620 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
55. Id. at 386.
56. No. 81-0851, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1988).
57. In one other case, State v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 531-33 (W.D. Wash. 1988),
the court held, without discussing the petroleum exclusion, that waste automotive crankcase





During the last decade, EPA has interpreted the petroleum exclusion ex-
pansively in numerous public notices and interpretations. 58 For example, in
a Federal Register notice announcing CERCLA notification requirements,
EPA stated that irrespective of their status under RCRA, "waste oils" did
not come within the definition of Superfund.5 9 In a subsequent notice an-
nouncing changes to these notification requirements, EPA said that the ex-
clusion would apply to crude oil, petroleum feedstocks, and refined
petroleum products. Moreover, EPA stated that the exclusion would still
apply despite the presence of a specifically listed substance in such
products.6o
Again, in a proposal made in November 1985 to list certain used oils as
hazardous wastes under RCRA, EPA recognized that such used oils, which
it believed to be highly toxic, had not previously been subject to CERCLA.61
In a further notice soliciting additional comments on its proposal to list used
oil as a hazardous waste under RCRA, the agency retreated somewhat and
suggested that CERCLA may already apply to used oils. The EPA stated,
however, that CERCLA would apply only to oils with levels of hazardous
substances in excess of those typically found in petroleum. 62 More recently,
when EPA proposed regulations to implement the underground storage tank
program, it stated that the release of petroleum from underground storage
tanks or other sources was not subject to CERCLA. 63
Similarly, EPA's office of General Counsel has read the petroleum exclu-
sion liberally in three internal guidance documents. In the first, the General
Counsel used language strikingly similar to that of the Wade court in hold-
ing that denying the benefits of the petroleum exclusion to diesel fuel, be-
cause it commonly contains benzene and tolune, would vitiate the petroleum
exclusion and defeat legislative intent.64 Instead, the General Counsel found
that CERCLA must not be applied to hazardous substances inherent in pe-
troleum fractions, but should be applied only to those hazardous substances
that are combined later with the petroleum product by way of adding or
58. See infra notes 59-63.
59. 45 Fed. Reg. 22,145 (Apr. 3, 1980).
60. 50 Fed. Reg. 13,460 (1985). The agency observed, however, that the petroleum exclu-
sion would not apply to waste oil "to which listed CERCLA substances have been added." Id.
61. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,258, 49,267 (proposed Nov. 29, 1985). When the agency ultimately
decided against listing used oil because of the "stigma" associated with listing, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,900, 49,101 (Nov. 19, 1986), it left used oil outside the scope of CERCLA. Now, however,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered EPA to determine whether to
list used oil solely under RCRA's technical criteria for listing. Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 861 F.2d 270, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For a discus-
sion of this case and its potential consequences, see Bailer, Opinion, 17 Chem. Waste Litig.
Rep. (Computer L. Rep.) 1 (1988).
62. 51 Fed. Reg. 8206 (1986).
63. 52 Fed. Reg. 12,760 (1987).
64. Memorandum from Robert M. Perry, EPA Associate Administrator and General
Counsel, to Dick Whittington, Regional Administrator, Region VI, Applicability of CERCLA
to Contamination of Ground Water By Diesel Oil 2-3 (Dec. 2, 1982).
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mixing. 65 Even then, he added, CERCLA would not apply to the petroleum
itself unless the extraneous contaminant was inseparably commingled with
the petroleum product.66
In the second interpretation, EPA's Acting General Counsel applied the
same rationale in determining that motor gasoline was covered by the petro-
leum exclusion even though it typically contains benzene. 67 The Acting
General Counsel reasoned that to apply the petroleum exclusion only to sub-
stances such as raw gasoline that do not contain benzene would, in effect,
nullify the exclusion. 68 In the General Counsel's view, the EPA should not
interpret a statute in such a way as to emasculate it.69
The EPA's General Counsel on July 31, 1987, issued the most comprehen-
sive interpretation of the petroleum exclusion to date. This interpretation
responded to the "critical and recurring" questions that had arisen in the
agency's enforcement of the exclusion.70 After an extensive review of the
language and legislative history of CERCLA and of prior agency pronounce-
ments concerning the scope of the petroleum exclusion, the memorandum
set forth a three-part definition of petroleum.7 1
First, the General Counsel stated that in order to give meaning to the
petroleum exclusion, the term "petroleum" must be read to include all haz-
ardous substances such as benzene that are "indigenous" to petroleum sub-
stances.72 Second, the term "petroleum" must also be read to include
hazardous substances that are "normally mixed with or added to crude oil or
crude oil fractions during the refining process."'73 The General Counsel rea-
soned that because such substances normally are added to petroleum during
oil separation and processing in order to produce petroleum, then such sub-
stances should be included within the term "petroleum."74
Third, the General Counsel stated that the term "petroleum" does not
include hazardous substances "which are added to petroleum or which in-
crease in concentration solely as a result of contamination of petroleum dur-
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id.
67. Memorandum from A. James Barnes, EPA Acting General Counsel, to Sheldon.
Novick, Regional Counsel, Region III, Applicability of the CERCLA Petroleum Exemption to
Gasoline Spills 4 (Aug. 12, 1988).
68. Id. The Acting General Counsel stated that under such an interpretation "the exemp-
tion would become a virtual nullity." Id.
69. Id. ("[a]n interpretation which emasculates a provision of a statute is not to be
preferred").
70. General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 842.
71. Id. at 842-44.
72. Id. at 844.
73. Id.
74. Id. In Wilshire Westwood the agency went further; it recognized that lead may be
added to gasoline, not just at a refinery, but also at a local distribution station, and it con-
cluded that
it makes no sense to have CERCLA jurisdiction turn on whether lead was added
at a refinery or at another processing point. EPA's position that unadulterated
leaded gasoline should fall within the petroleum exclusion is in keeping with
congressional intent as to the statute's language and the policy behind the
exclusion.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 3, at 20 n.17.
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ing use." Under this interpretation the General Counsel said that EPA has
authority to deal with releases of only the added substance, but may not
respond to releases of the oil itself.7" Elsewhere in the memorandum, the
General Counsel indicated that "spills or releases of gasoline remain ex-
cluded from CERCLA under the petroleum exclusion," as do "spills of
crude or refined petroleum."'76 Some used oils would also remain covered by
the exclusion because such used oils do not necessarily contain hazardous
substances that are either nonindigenous or at elevated levels.77 Moreover,
even the contaminants in used oils would not necessarily be subject to CER-
CLA because those particular contaminants may not fall within CERCLA's
definition of hazardous substances.78
II. THE WILSHIRE WESTWOOD CASE
In Wilshire Westwood the plaintiffs, who had purchased allegedly contam-
inated property for development, sued the defendants for the costs of clean-
ing up the property. 79 The plaintiffs believed that gasoline leaks from
underground storage tanks had contaminated the property. The plaintiffs
alleged that leaking tanks on the site contained additives including benzene,
toluene, xylene, ethyl-benzene and lead, all of which were hazardous sub-
stances within the meaning of CERCLA.
In an opinion issued on October 15, 1987, the district court initially de-
nied a motion to dismiss on the basis of the petroleum exclusion.80 While
finding that the petroleum exclusion applied to unleaded gasoline, despite
the presence of hazardous constituents, the court rejected the defendants'
argument that the exclusion similarly applied to leaded gasoline. The court
reasoned that lead was not petroleum but a gasoline additive, that lead was
listed under CERCLA as a hazardous substance, and that to treat lead dif-
ferently if released from gasoline than if released in other forms was
unjustified.81
Shortly after the district court issued its opinion, the defendants moved
for reconsideration. This motion was in response to new evidence, the Gen-
eral Counsel's memorandum of July 31, 1987.82 Because of the memoran-
dum a new round of briefing ensued and the court tersely determined that
75. General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 842-44. This statement suggested
that, under some conditions, a petroleum product may still be within the scope of the exclusion
even if CERCLA substances contaminated that product, and, in such a case, only the contami-
nants themselves would be subject to CERCLA response and liability.
76. Id. at 846.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3157, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1989).
80. Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1800, 1800 (1987).
81. Id.
82. See General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 8. In their briefs, the defendants
stated that they had first become aware of the General Counsel's interpretation when the
Chemical Waste Litigation Reporter published the memorandum and a follow-up article ana-
lyzing it. See Bailer, Opinion, 14 Chem. Waste Litig. Rep. (Computer L. Rep.) 858 (1987).
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leaded gasoline was included in CERCLA's petroleum exclusion. 83
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit received extensive briefing and argument on
the statutory language, legislative history, agency interpretations, and policy
considerations surrounding the petroleum exclusion. Notably, the briefing
included a forty-seven page brief filed by EPA (nominally the United States)
as amicus curiae in support of the defendants.
In its brief, EPA argued that affirmance of the district court's decision was
required by the "ordinary, contemporary, [and] common meaning" of the
term "petroleum" in CERCLA84 as well as by the legislative history of
CERCLA and subsequent congressional actions addressing petroleum.85
EPA also urged the court to defer to the General Counsel's memorandum of
July 31, 1987, as a reasonable agency interpretation that was consistent with
a long line of other agency interpretations.8 6 EPA further urged the court to
adopt a "middle ground" interpretation of the petroleum exclusion that
would neither expose all releases of petroleum to CERCLA liability nor dis-
able EPA from responding to any such releases.87 Specifically, EPA asked
the court to define petroleum as all commercial forms of petroleum, includ-
ing those containing indigenous hazardous constituents or hazardous sub-
stances that are normally mixed with or added to petroleum in the refining
process.88
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to go beyond the
"plain language" of the statute to determine that the petroleum exclusion
applied to leaded gasoline. 89 First, the court addressed the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that, under the canon of statutory construction known as the "doctrine
of the last antecedent," the phrase "which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance under Section 9601(A)-(F)" in sec-
tion 101(14) must be read to qualify the entire preceding phrase "[t]he term
[hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or
any fraction thereof." 90 The plaintiffs argued that the qualifying phrase
reached back to the word "petroleum," and therefore, the petroleum exclu-
sion must be understood not to apply to any substances, such as lead, con-
tained within petroleum that were specifically listed as hazardous under
section 9601(A)-(F). The court rejected this interpretation, finding that the
last antecedent to the qualifying phrase was the term "any fraction." Thus
the Court found that the only forms of petroleum not covered by the petro-
leum exclusion are "fractions"-which do not include gasoline-that have
been listed or designated as hazardous under Section 9601(A)-(F). 9 1
83. Wilshire Westwood, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2146-47.
84. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 3, at
15-20.
85. Id. at 20-37.
86. Id. at 37-39.
87. Id. at 12-13, 3946.
88. Id.
89. Wilshire Westwood, 881 F.2d at 803-05.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court also observed that the qualifying phrase would have used a plural verb
rather than a singular verb if Congress had intended that it modify the term "petroleum"-
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Second, the court disposed of the plaintiffs' argument based on various
cases in which common constituents of petroleum had been treated as haz-
ardous substances under CERCLA in other contexts.92 The plaintiffs also
argued that Congress could not have intended that these substances be
treated differently when released from underground gasoline storage tanks.93
The plaintiffs' reliance on these cases was misplaced, the court found, be-
cause these cases did not involve a specific statutory exclusion such as the
petroleum exclusion. 94
Third, the court observed that the plaintiffs' construction of the statute
must also be rejected because it would render the petroleum exclusion a nul-
lity.95 Since all of the substances of which the plaintiffs had complained
were indigenous to petroleum, any test that turned on whether these sub-
stances had been added to petroleum would be "nonsensical. '96
Next, the court explored at length the history of CERCLA, the amend-
ments to RCRA in 1984, and the reauthorization of CERCLA in 1986.
While finding it unnecessary to rely upon these sources, the court neverthe-
less believed that its interpretation followed legislative history.97 Focusing
particularly upon the 1984 and 1986 amendments, the court cautioned that
the views of subsequent Congresses do not necessarily furnish a sound basis
for inferring the intent of earlier ones, but concluded that "the very specific-
ity of these amendments to cover leaking gasoline, when conjoined with the
unchanged wording of the petroleum exclusion, cannot be disregarded in
fathoming the legislative intent in 1980."98
Finally, the court turned to the General Counsel's memorandum of July
31, 1987, interpreting the scope of the petroleum exclusion. Although the
court also found it unnecessary to base its decision on that document, it
observed that the General Counsel's interpretation was consistent with a
plain-meaning construction and legislative history.99 Moreover the court
noted that the General Counsel's opinion lent further support to its own
and thus cover all substances included within it-rather than merely modify the term "any
fraction." Id. at 804-05.
92. Id. at 805.
93. Id. The cases upon which the plaintiffs relied were: United States v. Conservation
Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 182-83 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (lead, benzene, ethyl-benzene, and
toluene are hazardous substances when released as part of chemical wastes); United States v.
Union Gas Co., 586 F. Supp. 1522, 1523 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (ethyl-benzene and xylene are haz-
ardous substances when released as constituents of coal tar); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21
E.R.C. 2124, 2125-26 (D.S.C. 1984) (lead is a hazardous substance when released as part of
water-based paint).
94. Wilshire Westwood, 881 F.2d at 805.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The court was "persuaded that the legislative history supports [its] plain meaning
construction." Id. The court also observed that Congress had not acted upon a bill intro-
duced in 1985 that would have subjected petroleum to liability under CERCLA if any of its
components were listed or designated. Id. at 806 (referring to H.R. 1881, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.(1985)).




interpretation.100 "We conclude that EPA's interpretation should be af-
forded considerable deference," the court continued, "as consideration has
been very thorough and consistent over time."10' 1
III. CONCLUSION
While the Ninth Circuit may not have gone as far as some interested par-
ties would have liked, including EPA, the court's decision undoubtedly will
be a valuable asset to those relying upon the petroleum exclusion in negotia-
tions or litigation with the government or other potentially responsible par-
ties at Superfund sites. At the very least, the decision should lay to rest,
once and for all, the objection that the petroleum exclusion should not be
applied because petroleum is just as hazardous as other CERCLA sub-
stances. Whatever the truth of the matter, 0 2 Wilshire Westwood establishes
that Congress intended that the petroleum exclusion be applied as written.
Beyond that, by firmly endorsing, although not finding necessary to its opin-
ion, the legislative history and the General Counsel's interpretation of the
petroleum exclusion, Wilshire Westwood has strengthened the hands of par-
ties in cases in which the statute itself may not so clearly furnish the rule of
decision.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 810. In a footnote, the court recounted the policy considerations that had led
EPA to seek a "middle ground" interpretation of the petroleum exclusion, but it found that
addressing these concerns was "not necessary to resolution of this appeal." Id. at 805 n.5.
102. As EPA noted at the time it published final regulations under Subpart I of RCRA, 53
Fed. Reg. 37,082, 37,188-89 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 280), petroleum-contaminated
soils are neither EPA-listed hazardous wastes, nor are they likely to meet RCRA's current
tests for hazardous waste characteristics. Even with respect to lead, "(tihe extremely high
absorption coefficient of lead . . . indicates that such soils are unlikely to ever exhibit the
characteristic of EP toxicity." Id. at 37,189. Were RCRA's test for toxicity amended so as to
treat as toxic all substances containing organic material such as benzene, toluene, and xylene-
a draft final rule to do this is currently under review at the Office of Management and
Budget-then virtually all petroleum products would be considered toxic by characteristic.
Nevertheless, the petroleum exclusion would still apply unless and until petroleum was also
"listed or designated" as hazardous.
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